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RECENT DECISIONS
In Beverly v. Thorpe'8 the Court held that a no-action clause in a
state recognizing such clauses as valid retained its vitality in a suit in
Wisconsin. Joinder of the insurer as a party defendant was not allowed
because Sec. 260.11 (1), although merely procedural, 9 also takes away
a valuable right and to apply it to a contract good in the state where
written would be unconstitutional as an impairment of a valid contract.
Ritterbusch v. Sexsmith made passing reference to the constitutional
ground applied in Byerly. The decision was in fact, though, made to
rest upon the conflict of laws doctrine that the law of the state where
a policy is issued determines the efficacy of the no-action clause.
"No case has been cited to us from the decisions of this
court or any other court which holds that the obligation of an
automobile liability policy is to be interpreted by any law other
than that of the state where the contract was made. Considering
the great volume of litigation growing out of automobile acci-
dents this dearth of authority is significant and not to be ex-
plained except by acknowledging the principle that the law of
the state where the contract is made determines the obligation
of the contract, not the law of the place of performance." 20
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to give
extra-territorial effect to Sec. 260.11(1) in every case where the issue
was raised. Whether these decisions have in fact construed Sec.
260.11(1) as being inapplicable to the policies under consideration or
whether instead the conflict of laws rule of Ritterbusch controls; the
result would appear to be the same, viz., Sec. 260.11(1) does not apply
to policies of insurance containing a no-action clause recognzied as
valid in the state where the policy was issued.
DONALD GANCER
Errors in Framing Special Verdict and Instructions: Necessity
of Motion for New Trial Grounded Thereon as Prerequisite to
Availability on Appeal-On trial of an auto negligence action,
counsel for the defendant objected to the form of a special verdict
proposed for submission to the jury, pointing out to the court that
the special verdict was duplicitous in that it permitted .finding
defendant's deceased driver negligent not only as to lookout, but
also as to management and control. The jury returned a special
verdict under which the driver was found causally negligent as to
speed, lookout, and management and control. After verdict, the
defendant moved for a new trial. The motion for new trial spe-
cified five grounds in support thereof, none of which specifically
Is Byerly v. Thorpe, 221 Wis. 28, 265 N.W. 76 (1936); Followed in Kilcoyne v
Trausch, 222 Wis. 528, 269 N.W. 276 (1936).
39 See notes 16 & 17 supra.20 See note 4 supra, 256 Wis. at 515, 41 N.W. 2d at 615. Two justices dissenting
to this statement of the conflict of laws rule.
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referred to the duplicitous verdict. The trial court denied the
motion and the defendant appealed from the judgment. Held: Af-
firmed. Although the defendant would be entitled to a new trial
because of the duplicitous verdict, the right to raise the issue on
appeal was lost by not affirmatively establishing by the record that
the error was called to the trial court's attention in considering the
motion, for new trial. The court stated the correct rule to be that:
". .. no error of the court should be reviewable as a
matter of right on appeal without first moving in the trial
court for a new trial bottomed on such error, if the error
is of a category that a trial court could correct by granting
a new trial."
Wells v. Diaryland Mutual Insurance Co., 274 Wis. 505, 80 N.W.
2d 380 (1957).
The Court mentioned that another rule often had been cited
as correct, -e., a motion for a new trial is necessary only to pre-
serve for review errors committed by the jury, and errors commit-
ted by the court are reviewable without such motion.' The Court
said a review of the cases presented a "chaotic inconsistency" and
a rectification was necessary.
A cursory examination of the Wisconsin cases dealing with the
necessity of a motion for a new trial discloses that inconsistency
has been present in the area. However, on closer examination, a
certain measure of consistency is found in the earlier decisions,
and, to this extent, the present decision is an innovation in Wiscon-
sin law.
Prior to the instant case, it was clear that to have a review of
certain errors there had to be a motion for new trial presented
to the trial court.2 Generally, if a review of the sufficiency of the
evidence was sought, a party was required to move in the trial
court for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary
1 This rule was cited in the following cases: McNamer v. American Insurance
Co., 267 Wis. 494, 66 N.W.2d 342 (1954); Sullivan v. Minneapolis, St. Paul
Railway Co., 167 Wis 518, 167 N.W. 311 (1918); Plankington v. Gorman,
93 Wis. 560, 67 N.W. 1128 (1896). See also Strnad v. Co-operative Insurance
Mutual, 256 Wis. 261, 40 N.W.2d 552 (1949), in which then Chief Justice
Rosenberry said it was ". .. the settled law of this state that errors committed
by the court may be reviewed by the supreme court upon an appeal from the
judgment in the absence of a motion for a new trial." This case is not clearly
in point as it dealt with an appeal from an order granting a new trial.
2 The only case which seemed to say a motion for a new trial directed to the
trial court was necessary in order to move the Supreme Court to order a new
trial in all cases was Krudwig v. Koepke, 223 Wis. 244, 270 N.W. 179 (1936).
The case was criticised-see 38 Wis. L. REv. 122.
WIs. STATS. §270.49 (1955), now reads "(1) The trial judge may enter-
tain a motion to be made on his minutes, to set aside a verdict and grant a
new trial because of errors in the trial or because the verdict is contrary to
law or to the evidence, or for excessive or inadequate damages or in the in-
terest of justice; .... "
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to the evidence.3 Likewise, a motion for new trial was definitely
necessary if there was a contention that damages were excessive. 4
However, it seems the motion was not necessary where the trial
court directed a verdict against a party or improperly denied a
motion for a directed verdict.5 There was also some authority to
the effect that errors in regard to the admission or rejection of
evidence could be raised on appeal without a motion for new trial.6
Whether errors in instructions were available on appeal if there
was no motion for new trial cannot be definitely determined.' It
would appear they were at one time.7 In the present case the court
cites a number of decisions which, it claims, created precedent for
its rule. However, an examination of the decisions cited (and of
those cited in the appellate briefs) indicates that the question in
such cases was whether the error was ever pointed out properly
to the lower court at all." One case cited, Mossak v. Pfost,9 on its
face supports the court's contention. In the Mossak case the court said:
"The instruction was erroneous. But we may not consider
the error; it was not. specifically pointed out by the plaintiff -in
her motion for a new trial as a ground therefor."'"
3 Strnad'v. Co-operative Insuraice Mutual, 256 Wis. 261, 40 N.W.2d 522'(1049);
Shores Lumber Co. v. Starke, 100 Wis. 498, 76 N.W. 366 (1898); Reed v.
City of Madison, 85 Wis. 667, 56 N.W. 182 (1893).
4 Howard v. Beldenville Lumber Co., 134 Wis. 644, 114 N.W. 1114 (1908). The
Court said the motion for a new trial must specify the grounds at least as
specifically as they are mentioned in the statute or the particular question
could not be raised on appeal.
5 McNamer v. American Insurance Co., 267 Wis. 494; 66 N.W.2d 342'-('1954);
Kopplinv. Quade, 145 .Wis. 454, 130 N.W. 511 (1911) ; Zahn v. Milwaukee and
Superior Railway Co., 114 Wis. 38, 89 N.W. 889 (1902) ; Wheeler v. Seamans,
*123 Wis. 573, 102 -.W. 28 (1905). There sehms to be n6 reason under the
main case to require a motion in the lower court when there is a contention
on appeal that a directed verdict should have been given. After all the party
is not asking for a new trial but for judgment in his favor.
6 Sullivan v. Minneapolis, St. Paul Railway Co.-, 167 Wis. 518, 167 N.W. 311
(1918). The Court said that under the settled law of this state, a question
of the improper admission of testimony could be reviewed on appeal even
though no motion for a new trial was made- in the lower court. The Court
questioned the language in several earlier cases which seemed to indicate the
motion was necessary.
7 Prichard v.. Deering Harvester Co., 117 Wis. 97, 93 N.W. 827 (1903)..
SIn Graves v. State, 12 Wis. *591 (1860), State v. Biller, 262 Wis. 472, 55
N.W.2d 414 (1952), and Zombkowski v. Wisconsin River Power Co., 267
Wis. 77, 64 N.W.2d 236 (1954), all cases cited-by the Court in the main case,
the issue was whether a party could raise an error in instructions for the
first time on appeal. Ferry v. State, 266 Wis. 508, 63 N.W.2d 741 (1954), is
another case cited by the Court. In the Ferry case it is obvious the lower
court was never informed of the claimed error in instructions. See the Brief
for the State, p. 33, which says, "The record discloses that no objection to
the court's instruction was ever made in the trial court."
One could suppose from a reading of these cases that although exceptions
did not have to be taken to instructions in the more recent cases, see note 13
infra, the error had to be pointed out to the trial court sometime, and the
only available time would normally be when the motion for new trial was
made.
9 258 Wis. 73, 44N.W.2d 922 (1950).
10 Id. at 76, 44 N.W.2d at 923.
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Norton v. State" is the only authority given for the quoted statement
in the Pfost case. Upon a check of the Norton case, and the authorities
listed therein, 12 we find that the cases merely say that if no proper
exception had been taken to a particular instruction, the mentioning
of the specific error on the motion for new trial would preserve the
question for appeal. Of course, in Wisconsin it is no longer necessary
either to take exception or to interpose any type of objection to in-
structions. 13
Whether there was confusion or not in the past is no longer too
important, for the Wisconsin Court has now made its position clear.
The following statement is certainly unequivocal:
"A procedural device which affords an opportunity to a trial
court to correct its own errors by directing a new trial, without
the necessity of an appeal to this court to reach the same result,
would seem to be in the public interest. During the course of a
trial the trial judge often is required to 'shoot from the hip' in
making his rulings without the benefit of briefs or time to make
an independent research of the authorities. A very different
situation prevails when the trial judge has before him after
verdict a motion for new trial grounded upon alleged error.
Time will then permit the preparation and filing of briefs by
counsel, and for the judge to do independent research of his
o nv."
14
PAUL F. WOJTKIEWICZ
Administrative Law-Notice of Special Assessment-Action in
equity to set aside special assessments. The City of Milwaukee levied
special assessments for street improvements against property owned
by the plaintiff. Abutting landowners were given notice of the assess-
ments by publciation, in compliance with the City Charter which pro-
vdied that notice of an assessment for street improvement benefits was
11 129 Wis. 659, 109 N.W. 531 (1906).
12 See Grabowski v. State, 126 Wis. 447, at 458, 105 N.W. 805, at 806 (1905).
'3 Wis. STATS. §270.39 (1955) ; Reuling v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. R. Co., 257
Wis. 485, 44 N.W.2d 253 (1950).
14 274 Wis. at 516. It might be argued that the trial court is not exactly forced
to "shoot from the hip" when there are objections to a proposed special ver-
dict, as happened in this case, for there is probably no more opportune time
to excuse the jury for a few hours and hear argument.
Lest one get the idea this note is a criticism of the rule laid down, it
should be noted that some other states have the same rule. See 3 AM. JUR.,
Appeal & Error §267. Further, it should be obvious that if there is any
possibility of preventing the expense of an appeal, the possibility should be
exhausted.
The main case has already been cited with approval in two cases. In
Frion v. Craig, 274 Wis. 550, 80 N.W2d 808 (1957), the Court decided that
the trial judge's questioning of witnesses and comments during the trial
could not be raised on appeal because not raised in the motions after verdict.
In Bronk v. Mijal, 275 Wis. 194, 81 N.W.2d 481 (1957), the Court held
that although the court was requested to submit a certain question in the
special verdict, failure to move for a new trial after verdict bottomed upon
such error precluded the raising of the issue on appeal.
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